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RESTRUCTURING PROVISION AND STATE CHARTER
SCHOOL LAWS: THE NEED FOR AUTONOMY, FLEXIBILITY,
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∗

INTRODUCTION

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) instilled new ur1
gency in the quest to improve America’s public schools. NCLB requires schools to meet state-defined performance benchmarks, and
schools that fail to do so are deemed as in need of “school improvement,” “corrective action,” or “restructuring” and are subject to esca2
lating penalties. The most severe sanction occurs after a school fails
to meet a state’s benchmarks for six consecutive years and, therefore,
must fundamentally reform its governance operations through the
3
process of restructuring. NCLB delineates five ways in which a
school may restructure, one of which is the charter conversion option, whereby a school reopens as an independent entity but still op4
erates within the public school system. Charter schools provide
autonomous and alternative education models. Since these schools
are governed according to state law, however, many states micromanage charter schools to the point that they are virtually indistinguish5
able from traditional public schools.
A tension arises between
∗
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1
LAUREN MORANDO RHIM, RESTRUCTURING SCHOOLS IN BALTIMORE: AN ANALYSIS
OF STATE AND DISTRICT EFFORTS 7 (2004), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearing
house/53/24/5324.doc.
2
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (Supp. II 2002).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Sandra Vergari, Introduction to THE CHARTER SCHOOL LANDSCAPE 1, 2 (Sandra
Vergari ed., 2002).
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NCLB’s focus on fundamental restructuring and charter school statutes that do not allow for a complete overhaul of a school’s governance structure.
NCLB imparts lofty goals of achievement and accountability,
mandates the goal of full proficiency in reading and mathematics by
the 2013–14 school year, and demarcates steps that state and local
6
educational agencies must take to achieve that goal. A cornerstone
of this law is its robust emphasis on accountability, explicit in the notion that the goal of leaving no child behind will be attained only if
7
schools are held accountable for improving achievement. As a result, NCLB requires states to track progress through student per8
formance on standardized tests. States must use these test results to
determine whether a school is making progress towards attaining
proficiency, which is defined under NCLB as Adequate Yearly Pro9
gress (AYP). Broadly speaking, AYP is a state-specified benchmark of
whether a school has satisfactorily improved in its academic perform10
ance towards achieving the long-term goal of proficiency.
In the initial four years of a school failing to make AYP, NCLB
requires increasingly remedial actions, beginning with a probationary
11
period and culminating in corrective action. A school that fails to
make AYP for one year enters a “warning year,” but the school is not
12
sanctioned per se. When a school is in its second or third year of
failing to make AYP, it is labeled as in need of “school improvement,”
whereby the school district must develop a plan to turn around the
school, offer choices for students to transfer to non-failing public
schools, and provide free after-school tutoring from a provider of the
13
parent’s choice. After four years of failing to make AYP, the school
is identified as in need of “corrective action,” and the school district
must take more severe action, such as replacing school staff and insti14
tuting a new curriculum.

6

OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., LEA AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT:
NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE (REVISED) 1 (2006), available at www.ed.gov/policy/
elsec/guid/schoolimprovementguid.pdf.
7
Id.
8
20 U.S.C. § 6311(a)(1) (Supp. II 2002).
9
Id. § 6311(b)(2).
10
Id.
11
Id. § 6316.
12
REBECCA WOLF DIBIASE, ECS POLICY BRIEF: STATE INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL
RESTRUCTURING UNDER NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND IN 2004–05 SCHOOL YEAR 2 (2005),
available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/64/28/6428.pdf.
13
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)–(6).
14
Id. § 6316(b)(7).
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After five years of failing to meet AYP, NCLB requires a school to
create a plan for restructuring—a complete overhaul of the school’s
15
governance. If the school fails to meet AYP for a sixth year, it must
16
undertake the onerous task of implementing the restructuring plan.
NCLB requires that the school fundamentally reform its governance
operations by choosing one of five restructuring options: (1) chartering, (2) turnarounds, (3) contracting, (4) state takeovers, or (5)
17
“other fundamental reforms that alter a school’s governance.”
Each restructuring option is intended to usher in a systemic re18
form in how the school is governed. Chartering involves the school
district closing the current school and reopening it as a public char19
ter school. Turnarounds require the school district to replace all or
most of the school staff, including the principal, who are relevant to
20
the school’s failure. Under the contracting option, the school district closes the current school and reopens it as a school managed by
21
an outside entity, such as a private management company. A state
22
takeover involves turning over the failing school to the state. Finally, the school district may choose the “other” restructuring option,
in which the school makes a fundamental reform in the governance
structure with the “substantial promise of enabling the school to
23
make adequate yearly progress.”
Chartering, when employed within a suitable framework, fulfills
the central purpose of NLCB’s restructuring provision—
fundamentally reforming the “failing” school’s governance operations. This Comment examines the relationship between inflexible
state charter laws that undermine a charter school’s autonomy and
NCLB’s focus on restructuring options that radically alter a school’s
governance operations. Because chartering is a creature of state statute, certain charter schools are encumbered by unreasonable restrictions. State laws promulgating stringent requirements of accountability are weaker than they may appear at first glance, and, in turn, the
charter schools are constrained and unable to live up to NCLB’s re-

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. § 6316(b).
Id.
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 2.
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (Supp. II 2002).
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(ii).
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iii).
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iv).
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(v).
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quirement of a fundamental reform in governance. Several core
indispensable features of a charter school serve to distinguish charter
schools from traditional public schools. State charter laws that deny
autonomy and flexibility and do not grant adequate resources create
charter schools that are materially indistinguishable from the traditional public school model. Such rigid laws are inconsistent with the
purpose and framework of NCLB’s restructuring provision and thus
are impermissible options.
An analysis of NCLB, focusing on its enactment and purpose,
provides the background for this remedial legislation in the beginning of Part II. The NCLB discussion includes a close examination of
two critical components of the law: AYP and restructuring. Part II
ends with a discussion of NCLB’s five restructuring options. Part III
analyzes the purpose and elements of a charter school and, in doing
so, distinguishes charter schools from traditional public schools. In
the context of this discussion of NCLB and charter schools, Part IV
fleshes out the charter-school option in light of NCLB’s goals. This
Comment identifies the irreducible elements of a charter school—
autonomy, flexibility, and adequate resources—and concludes that a
charter-school framework that does not include these fundamental
elements is inconsistent with NCLB’s purpose and goals and, as a result, is impermissible under the statute.
II. NCLB: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Education Reform Movement and NCLB’s Inception
The promise of change resonated in President George W. Bush’s
signature as he signed NCLB into law on January 8, 2002, and de25
clared the beginning of a “new era” in American public education.
The federal government enacted the law to “ensure that all children
have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality
26
education” and to promote high-performing schools, amidst a grow-

24

Jennifer Hochschild, Rethinking Accountability Politics, in NO CHILD LEFT
BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 108 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003). Note that “strong laws” are not laws that impose
more rules, but just the opposite—laws that allow for greater flexibility.
25
Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Signs Landmark Education Bill (Jan. 8, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/01/20020108-1.html; see also Elisabeth Busmiller, Focusing on the
Home Front, Bush Signs Education Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, at A1.
26
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002).
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ing public awareness of the need to better educate America’s chil27
dren.
To truly understand the significance of NCLB, it is necessary to
examine the law in the context of a broader education reform effort.
NCLB is the latest step in the reform movement, which seeks to en28
sure uniform and measurable school accountability.
Released by
the federal government in 1983, A Nation at Risk—the first step in the
movement—reported the decreased competitiveness of American
students in the international market and called for a diverse range of
educational reforms in hopes of reversing the downward trend in
29
This publication pushed the nation
American public education.
toward the idea of accountability, principally by raising educational
30
issues higher on political agendas. More specifically, it introduced
novel ideas and proposed basic reforms, such as the need for students
to be given more challenging tasks, for teachers to be better trained
and compensated, and for states to strengthen their commitment to
31
quality education.
As the education reform movement gained momentum, the federal government’s actions to ensure the successful improvement of
the public education system intensified. In 1994, Congress amended
32
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)
through the passage of the Improving America’s Schools Act
33
(IASA). The signature component of the ESEA, and thereafter the
IASA, is Title I, the federal government’s single largest education aid
program, aimed at helping disadvantaged students in kindergarten
34
through twelfth grade. NCLB reauthorizes the IASA and the ESEA
and further requires that school districts receiving Title I funding de-

27

OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1.
Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District Act
and New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 128–31 (2007).
29
NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/
index.html; see also CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE 108TH CONGRESS 307 (Edward H. Crane & David Boaz eds., 2003), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-29.pdf.
30
Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, Introduction to NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?: THE
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (Paul E. Peterson & Martin R.
West eds., 2003).
31
Id.
32
20 U.S.C.S. § 7801 (2000) (now included as part of the 2001 NCLB).
33
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002). The IASA of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-382, 108
Stat. 3618 (1994) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301–7941 (2003)) was enacted on October 20, 1994, to reauthorize the ESEA.
34
Id.
28
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velop coherent and rigorous academic standards and that all students
35
attain proficiency within twelve years.
NCLB represents a bipartisan compromise that increases the
36
role of the federal government in education. Moreover, the legislation reflects the federal government’s commitment to equal educa37
tion for all children, regardless of race or socioeconomic status. Although the law marks a distinguishable shift in the degree of federal
power over education, scholars have debated the extent of the shift.
One scholar described NCLB as a “step toward institutionalizing various types of market-driven reforms” by requiring school districts to
offer choice, provide access to supplemental services, and reform
38
schools. Conversely, other academics have taken a more extreme
position on the impact of NCLB, calling it a “massive shift” in federal
39
power over education. Still others hail the law as particularly remarkable in light of the U.S. Constitution’s silence on the federal
40
government’s role in education.

35

Andrew Rudalevige, No Child Left Behind: Forging a Congressional Compromise, in
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 26
(Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003). Curiously, NCLB does not define
one level of proficiency that all students must attain within twelve years. Rather,
NCLB leaves it to individual states to determine what constitutes academic proficiency. BELLA ROSENBERG, WHAT’S PROFICIENT?: THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT AND
THE MANY MEANINGS OF PROFICIENCY 2 (2004), http://www.aft.org/pubsreports/downloads/teachers/WhatsProficient.pdf. Therefore, academic proficiency
may vary greatly from state to state. For a detailed discussion of proficiency, see id.
36
Busmiller, supra note 25, at A1.
37
Shavar D. Jeffries, The Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools for Stigmatized Minorities: The Need for Institutional Remedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 38 (2006) (“NCLB is
the culmination of [a] growing federal role, requiring states, among other things, to
meet more rigorous academic standards, implement annual testing in specified
grades, ensure schools employ ‘highly qualified’ teachers, and initiate federally defined accountability regimes.”).
38
RHIM, supra note 1, at 7.
39
Thomas Rentschler, No Child Left Behind: Admirable Goals, Disastrous Outcomes,
12 WIDENER L. REV. 637, 642 (2006). Another journalist went so far as to assert that
NCLB is the most important education plan since Brown v. Board of Education, which
outlawed school segregation in 1954. Other Opinion: Failure Flunking No Child Left Behind, TIMES LEADER (Pa.), May 3, 2005, at A9.
40
Ralph D. Mawdsley & J. Joy Cumming, School District Accountability, Special Education Students, and the Dilemma of High Stakes Testing: An Australia-United States Comparison, 188 EDUC. LAW REP., 2004, at 1, 2 (citing MICHAEL W. LAMORTE, SCHOOL LAW:
CASES AND CONCEPTS 2–3 (2007)). The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
has been historically construed as reserving the powers involving education to individual states’ domain. Id.
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B. NCLB’s Driving Force Is Accountability
The federal government passed NCLB with the promise to
41
change the culture of the nation’s schools, to ensure a fair, equal,
and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education for all
42
children. The U.S. Department of Education highlights four pillars
that sustain the ideals of NCLB: (1) accountability, (2) flexibility, (3)
43
research-based education, and (4) parent options. Each of these
pillars stems from NCLB’s underlying goal of creating highperforming schools throughout the country. However, the law’s cornerstone pillar is the accountability provision, which builds upon the
notion of rigorous academic content and high achievement stan44
dards.
NCLB emphasizes accountability by requiring schools to meet
state-specified standards, and the failure to meet these standards will
45
result in sanctions. NCLB seeks to hold schools accountable if they
are under-performing, or “failing,” by requiring states to measure
student performance and to ensure that students attain proficiency in
46
reading and math by the 2013–14 school year. Schools are rated according to their AYP, a benchmark which requires a state-specified
percentage of students to meet proficiency standards on assessment
47
tests. To receive federal aid, every state must establish a set of standards and a comprehensive testing plan for measuring proficiency of
48
those standards.
NCLB requires that state educational agencies
(SEAs) and local educational agencies (LEAs) annually review the
49
status of every school to ensure that the school is reaching AYP.
41

WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 1.
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II 2002).
43
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Overview: Four Pillars of NCLB (July 1, 2004),
http://www.ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/4pillars.html.
44
OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1.
45
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2).
46
Id. § 6311.
47
Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C) (Supp. II 2002).
“Adequate yearly progress” shall be defined by the State in a matter
that: (i) applies the same high standards of academic achievement to
all public elementary school and secondary school students in the
State; (ii) is statistically valid and reliable; (iii) results in continuous
and substantial academic improvement for all students; (iv) measures
the progress of public elementary schools, secondary schools, and
local educational agencies and the State . . . ; (v) includes separate
measurable annual objectives for continuous and substantial improvement . . . .
Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(i)–(v).
48
Id. See generally West & Peterson, supra note 30, at 1–2.
49
OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1.
42
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Schools that continuously fail to meet AYP targets face increas50
ingly punitive measures.
The yardstick of success is standardized
testing. Accountability is ultimately accomplished by the tabulation
of test scores, which are used to determine whether schools are mak51
ing AYP toward full proficiency. Annual local and state district report cards inform governmental agencies and parents about a
52
school’s progress. Students at schools that fail to meet these standards may transfer to other schools in the same district and, if a
school chronically fails to make adequate progress, the school is subject to escalating consequences, ultimately culminating in restructur53
ing.
The unifying principles of the other three pillars—flexibility, research-based education, and parent options—are access and choice.
Parents with children attending low-performing schools have new options under NCLB. For example, school districts must tell parents if
their child is enrolled in a Title I school that has been identified for
54
school improvement, corrective action, or restructuring. NCLB requires that the LEA make a choice available for students by the first
day of the school year following the school year in which the LEA
administered the assessments that resulted in the school being
55
deemed as in need of improvement. At a minimum, this notification must inform parents that their child is eligible to attend another
public school and identify each public school in the district that the
56
parent can select. Moreover, NCLB grants parents access to free after-school tutoring if their child attends a school marked in need of
57
improvement.
C. Drastic Times Call for Drastic Measures: The Restructuring
Provision of NCLB
NCLB prescribes escalating stages of intervention to ensure that
students at struggling schools are supplied with increasing amounts
58
of assistance. After failing to make AYP for one year, the school is
warned, but there is no formal sanction; rather, it is at this time that

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

20 U.S.C. § 6316(b).
Id. § 6311.
OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 1.
Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. §6316 (b)(8)(B) (Supp. II 2002).
34 C.F.R. § 200.36(b)(4) (2007).
OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at A-1.
Id.
Id. at B-6, E-4.
Id.
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the AYP clock starts ticking. After another year of failing to make
59
At this
AYP, the school is identified for “school improvement.”
stage, the school must offer students the choice to attend an AYP60
satisfying school. If a school fails to make AYP for three consecutive
61
years, the school district must continue to provide the students with
62
the option to transfer to another public school.
During the initial three years of a school failing to make AYP,
the sanctions imposed symbolize the theme of change. For example,
school districts may contract out with private organizations to provide
supplemental educational services to increase academic enrichment
63
for students attending schools in need of improvement. Allowing
school districts and parents to choose private providers for services,
such as tutoring, symbolizes a level of fundamental change in the
school’s structure, which is traditionally controlled by the public sector. In effect, this choice places pressure on the school and other
64
public providers to improve.
After failing to make AYP for four consecutive years, the school
district must continue to offer the choice to transfer and a range of
supplemental services, but it must also implement “corrective ac65
tions.” Corrective actions “substantially and directly” respond to the
66
“consistent academic failure of a school.” They are “significant in59

Id.
Id. at B-6.
61
The labels designated to schools after each year of failing to make AYP can be
rather confusing. Since a formal label is not placed on the school after one year of
failing to make AYP, this year can be thought of as the “Warning Year.” It is not until
two consecutive years of failing to make AYP that a school is designated as being in
“School Improvement Year 1.” Therefore, a school that fails to make AYP for three
consecutive years is actually in “School Improvement Year 2.” See generally OFFICE OF
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at B-1–H-1.
62
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(5) (Supp. II 2002).
63
OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., SUPPLEMENTAL EDUCATIONAL
SERVICES: NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE A-1 (2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/
policy/elsec/guid/suppsvcsguid.doc. “Supplemental educational services must be
provided outside of the regular school day. Supplemental educational services must
be high quality, research-based, and specifically designed to increase student academic achievement.” Id.
64
The downstream effect of choice is a highly contested question that is beyond
the scope of this Comment, but must be acknowledged. See, e.g., JULIAN R. BETTS ET
AL., DOES SCHOOL CHOICE WORK? EFFECTS ON STUDENT INTEGRATION AND ACHIEVEMENT
3–4 (2006), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_806JBR.pdf;
JULIE BERRY CULLEN ET AL., THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL CHOICE ON STUDENT OUTCOMES:
EVIDENCE FROM RANDOMIZED LOTTERIES (2003), available at http://ideas.repec.org/
p/nbr/nberwo/10113.html.
65
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(7).
66
Id.
60
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67

tervention[s]” designed to correct the school’s chronic failure to
68
make AYP. Identifying a school for corrective action indicates the
LEA’s intention to take greater control of the school’s governance
and to have a more hands-on approach to the school’s decisionmaking processes. Moreover, this label signals that the initial approaches to school improvement have been unsuccessful and that
more extreme action is necessary to bolster learning conditions and
69
progress.
If “school improvement” and “corrective action” interventions
prove unsuccessful, the school finally meets the fate of restructuring,
70
a fundamental governance reform. School restructuring is a twostep process. The first step begins after a school fails to make AYP for
71
five consecutive years. At that time, the school must develop a plan
72
After failing to make AYP for six consecutive
for restructuring.
years, the school enters the second step and must implement the re73
structuring plan. Generally, when a school is in restructuring status,
the LEA must make crucial and substantive efforts to overhaul the
74
governance of that school.
NCLB permits five options for school restructuring:
(i) Reopening the school as a public charter school.
(ii) Replacing all or most of the school staff (which may include
the principal) who are relevant to the failure to make adequate yearly progress.
(iii) Entering into a contract with an entity, such as a private
management company, with a demonstrated record of effectiveness, to operate the public school.
(iv) Turning the operation of the school over to the State educational agency, if permitted under State law and agreed to by
the State.
(v) Any other major restructuring of the school’s governance
arrangement that makes fundamental reforms, such as significant changes in the school’s staffing and governance, to
improve student academic achievement in the school and
that has substantial promise of enabling the school to make

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at F-1.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 5.
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(A) (Supp. II 2002).
Id.
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at G-1.
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75

Federal regulations explain the kind of restructuring contemplated by NCLB. These rules define restructuring as a “major reorganization of a school’s governance arrangement” by a LEA that: “(1)
makes fundamental reforms . . . to improve student academic
achievement in the school; (2) has substantial promise of enabling
76
the school to make AYP . . . ; and (3) is consistent with State law.”
NCLB’s restructuring provision unambiguously requires fundamental reforms in school governance. The concept of fundamental
reform is even more apparent when the restructuring option is
viewed in the context of its precipitating sanctions of “school improvement” and “corrective action.” To demonstrate just how pervasively this theme is woven into each of the five options, it is vital to
briefly analyze each option. Option (i) permits the school to close
77
and reopen as a charter school.
78
Option (ii), the turnaround option, imposes fundamental
change by requiring schools to replace staff who are responsible for
79
the school’s failure, including the principal. While entire staff replacement is a viable route under this option, research indicates that
many of these schools are “turned around” by merely replacing the
80
principal or members of the administration. Often, there will not
be substantial teacher replacement in these schools. For that reason,
turnaround is a common option for satisfying NCLB’s restructuring
provision because it only has a minimal impact on the teachers re81
maining in a restructured school. Nevertheless, this option constitutes a fundamental reform because it literally changes the composition of the governing body at the school.
Option (iii), the contracting option, requires fundamental governance change by compelling a school to contract out to a private or
82
non-profit organization. The school district closes the school and
75

20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
34 C.F.R. § 200.43 (2007).
77
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (Supp. II 2002). Since this option is the crux of
the present Comment, it will be further analyzed in Parts III and IV.
78
CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, SCHOOL
RESTRUCTURING UNDER NCLB: WHAT WORKS WHEN? A GUIDE FOR EDUCATION LEADERS
3 (2006). Some scholars have referred to this option as the “reconstitution” option.
E.g., BETTY MALEN ET AL., RECONSTITUTING SCHOOLS: “TESTING” THE “THEORY OF
ACTION” 113–32 (2002).
79
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(ii).
80
CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 43.
81
Id.
82
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iii).
76
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reopens it as a school managed by an outside governing unit with a
well-established record of success, such as an education management
83
organization (EMO). The school district selects the EMO to man84
age the school and monitors the EMO’s performance. The district
retains some level of control because it can rescind the contract if
85
student achievement does not improve. This option represents a
substantial reform because it involves an entirely innovative governance model. American education institutions have historically been
86
public enterprises. Therefore, contracting out a public enterprise
(i.e., a traditional public school) to a private entity is a radically novel
alternative.
Option (iv), known as a state takeover, also requires fundamen87
tal change by turning the school operations over to the SEA. There
are compelling reasons why an LEA would command a state takeover.
The LEA might invite such action when the district is unable to govern the restructuring decision process for all of the failing schools in
88
its district. A district may adopt this option if it does not have the
capability to manage the implementation of restructuring in each in89
dividual school, because such oversight is logistically impossible.
Analogous to the other restructuring options, this option represents a
significant reform because of the longstanding tradition of local educational control in our society.
Finally, option (v) permits the school to restructure by choosing
90
another form of major restructuring. The statutory provision explicitly requires fundamental reforms in governance with “substantial
91
promise” of allowing the school to make AYP.
Although the law
does not specify how this option can be implemented, proposed examples include significant changes to accommodate the needs of a
small sub-group of under-achieving students, such as creating smaller
92
learning communities. This restructuring option may also be help83

CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 7.
Id.
85
Id.
86
William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteen Century Corporation: A Match Made
in the Public Interest, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023, 1024 (1998).
87
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(iv) (Supp. II 2002).
88
CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 19.
89
Id.
90
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(v). The broad, and somewhat ambiguous, language of option (v) indicates that this option is really a catch-all, encompassing the
scope and essence of the restructuring provision. The four preceding options are
examples of how the catch-all may be practically implemented.
91
Id.
92
CTR. FOR COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT, supra note 78, at 8.
84
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ful for schools in which a new leader has been hired and, while the
school continues to fail to make AYP, the new leader has achieved
93
some improvements, albeit not a satisfactory turnaround. In this instance, there is the expectation that with training and support, the
94
new leader can become a “turnaround” leader.
D. America’s Public Schools Are “Restructuring”
In the aftermath of NCLB’s passage, SEAs and LEAs face the
daunting task of ensuring academic achievement and progress. Since
many schools are now in the restructuring phase, or rapidly approaching this point, an analysis of the restructuring provision is both
a relevant and important discussion. However, NCLB gives very little
95
guidance on how restructuring should be implemented, notwithstanding its palpable effect.
In the 2005–06 school year, approximately six hundred schools
96
in the nation were in the restructuring phase. Since many more
schools will meet this fate in the upcoming years, school restructuring
will have significant consequences, not just for state and national
97
leaders, but for communities across the nation. Statistical projections estimate that nearly 2000 schools will be in restructuring in the
98
2007–08 school year and 3200 schools in the 2008–09 school year.

93

Id.
Id.
95
Congress left to the states the standards to be set, the design of testing instruments, and the administration of accountability systems. West & Peterson, supra note
30, at 8–9. As a result, states differ in their methods of creating and implementing
standardized tests.
96
Bryan C. Hassel, Emily Ayscue Hassel & Lauren Morando Rhim, Introduction:
Overview of Restructuring, in HANDBOOK ON RESTRUCTURING AND SUBSTANTIAL SCHOOL
IMPROVEMENT 9, 10 (Herbert J. Walberg ed., 2007) (citing National Center for Education Statistics, Participation in Education (Washington D.C., 2005)), available at
http://www.centerii.org/survey/downloads/Restructuring%20Handbook.pdf. This
is not even an accurate representation of low-performing schools, since most states
have not been tracking AYP long enough for schools to enter restructuring. Id.
97
See, e.g., RON BRADY, CAN FAILING SCHOOLS BE FIXED? 28–31 (2003), available at
http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/failing_schools.pdf.
98
Hassel et al., supra note 96, at 10 (citing Center on Education Policy, From the
Capital to the Classroom: Year Four of the No Child Left Behind Act (Washington D.C.,
2006)). Current periodicals also emphasize the growing number of schools in restructuring. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Bush Proposes Broadening the No Child Left
Behind Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, at A1 (“[T]here were currently about 1,800 of
these schools across the country, where students have failed to meet state targets for
reading and math for more than five years.”).
94
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Restructuring has been largely an urban phenomenon.
In the
2005–06 school year, approximately ninety percent of schools in re100
Moreover, the restrucstructuring were located in urban districts.
turing in fifteen school districts accounted for nearly one-half of all
101
schools in restructuring.
Although NCLB delineates five options for restructuring, the
102
precise courses of action are omitted from the statute’s text.
Consequently, specific approaches to each of the restructuring options
103
vary widely among the states. Most states have opted for a hands-off
104
approach, attained through option (v). The Government Accountability Office reported that forty percent of schools facing restructuring selected option (v), thereby making “other” changes, such as cre105
However, such minor steps
ating smaller learning communities.
toward restructuring are incompatible with the goal of NCLB’s restructuring provision, which explicitly requires fundamental re106
The federal government intended for the restructuring proform.
vision to serve as a last resort, only after the school has failed to meet
AYP for several consecutive years and the preceding penalties have
107
SEAs and LEAs that “restructure” by merely
proven unsuccessful.
creating smaller learning communities, replacing a few teachers, or
changing textbook publishers are not adhering to the requirement of
fundamental reform. Each state has a legal responsibility to ensure
108
compliance with the federal mandate of a fundamental reform.

99

Julie Kowal & Bryan C. Hassel, Remedies in Action: Four “Restructured” Schools, in
NO REMEDY LEFT BEHIND: LESSONS FROM A HALF-DECADE OF NCLB 267, 269 (Frederick
M. Hess & Chester E. Finn Jr. eds., 2007).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B) (Supp. II 2002).
103
WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 3.
104
Id.
105
David J. Hoff, Some Schools Take No Restructuring Action, GAO Finds, EDUC. WK.,
Sept. 12, 2007, at 21. Although option (v) has been interpreted as a laissez-faire approach, this Comment contends that Congress actually intended for that option to
be just as drastic a measure as the other four options in the restructuring provision.
106
See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b).
107
WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 3.
108
This Comment seeks to analyze and interpret the restructuring provision itself,
and demonstrate how individual state laws either promote or inhibit successful restructuring. The ongoing and contentious debate about assessing academic
achievement and methods for accountability is beyond the scope of this Comment.

GOTTLIEB (FINAL)

2009]

1/26/2009 12:36:46 PM

205

COMMENT

III. CHARTER SCHOOLS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL
PUBLIC SCHOOL FRAMEWORK
A. What Is a Charter School?
109

Charter schools are “legally and fiscally” autonomous public
110
schools operated under a charter granted by a state’s government.
A charter school’s grant may be authorized by various entities. Depending on state laws, charter school authorizers may include state
education boards, universities, and most commonly, local school dis111
The founding charter is a legal agreement between the autricts.
thorizer and the school’s governing body, which describes the
112
school’s management, goals, and autonomy.
Typically, charter
schools are founded and established by educators, community
groups, or private organizations that function under a contract, gen113
erally for three to five years. The majority of charter schools in the
United States are new schools starting from scratch, while the “closeand-reopen” option—whereby a traditional public school closes and
reopens as a charter school (as would be the case with NCLB restruc114
turing)—is less common.
The steady growth of the charter school movement has garnered
national, albeit controversial, attention. Currently, forty states and

109

Vergari, supra note 5, at 2.
CHESTER E. FINN, BRUNO V. MANNO & GREGG VANOUREK, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN
ACTION: RENEWING PUBLIC EDUCATION 14–15 (2000). The charter school movement
was created in the midst of stagnant results in education and rose to prominence
with the backing of two powerful reform movements, the accountability and choice
movements. Tom Loveless, Charter School Achievement and Accountability, in NO CHILD
LEFT BEHIND?: THE POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY 177, 177–78
(Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West eds., 2003). The charter school movement began in 1991, when Minnesota passed the first charter school law, with California following suit in 1992. U.S. Charter Schools, History of Charter Schools, http://www.
uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs_docs/o/history.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2008). By
1995, nineteen states enacted charter laws, and by 2003, the number of states with
charter laws expanded to forty. Id. The federal government has authenticated charter schools since the inception of the Public Charter Schools Program in 1994. Vergari, supra note 5, at 1.
111
Paul A. Herdman, Nelson Smith & Cynthia Skinner, Charter Schools and the New
Federal Accountability Provisions, EDUC. PERFORMANCE NETWORK POL’Y BRIEF, Mar. 2002,
at 5.
112
MATTHEW D. ARKIN & JULIE M. KOWAL, REOPENING AS A CHARTER SCHOOL 4
(2005), available at http://www.centerforcsri.org/pubs/restructuring/Knowledge
Issues2Chartering.pdf.
113
TODD M. ZIEBARTH, CLOSING LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS AND REOPENING THEM
AS CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE ROLE OF THE STATE 1 (2004).
114
ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 5.
110
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the District of Columbia have charter school laws. Moreover, there
are an estimated 4303 charter schools throughout the country, and
116
1,259,571 students attending such schools. For the 2008–09 school
117
year, 355 new charter schools opened nationwide.
Statistics, however, do not truly capture the essence of what it
means to be a charter school. In order to understand the phenomenon and its implications, a proper examination explores how charter
schools differ from traditional public schools. First and foremost,
charter schools are independent from the school district and are
given a higher degree of autonomy in managing the school in ex118
A major reason ofchange for a greater degree of accountability.
ten cited for the rapid expansion of the charter school movement is
the privilege to be “exempt from burdensome, stifling, innovation
119
The charkilling features” of the traditional public school model.
ter school concept has been depicted as an understated but powerful
method of offering innovative choice in public education without the
120
characteristic micromanagement of government bureaucracies.
Charter schools share certain qualities of traditional public schools in
121
that they receive government funding and cannot charge tuition.
However, charter schools are exempt from many state restrictions

115

NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., GROWTH AND QUALITY IN THE CHARTER
SCHOOL MOVEMENT: 2008 DASHBOARD 1 (2008), http://www.publiccharters.org/files/
publications/Charter_Dashboard_2008.pdf.
116
Id. The Center for Education Reform reports slightly different statistics for the
2008–09 school year: 4568 charter schools, and 1,341,687 students in charter schools.
Ctr. for Educ. Reform, National Charter School Data: 2008–2009 New School Estimates,
http://www.edreform.com/_upload/CER_charter_numbers.pdf (last visited Dec. 28,
2008).
117
Ctr. for Educ. Reform, All About Charter Schools, http://www.edreform.com/
index.cfm?fuseAction=document&documentID=1964 (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
118
Robin D. Barnes, Group Conflict and the Constitution: Race, Sexuality, and Religion:
Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375, 2380 (1997)
(citing National Survey and Analysis of Charter School Legislation: A Report to the
Citizens of the State of Connecticut I-1 (Institute for Responsive Education Report
1996)).
119
Robert J. Martin, Rigid Rules for Charter Schools: New Jersey as a Case Study, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 439, 442 (2005) (citing SEYMOUR B. SARASON, CHARTER SCHOOLS:
ANOTHER FLAWED EDUCATION REFORM? vii (1998)).
120
Id. (citing Bruno V. Mano, How Charter Schools are Different: Lessons and Implications from a National Study, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 488 (1998)).
121
Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Charter Schools Under the NLCB:
Choice and Equal Educational Opportunity, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 165, 177–78
(2007) (citing Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District,
84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 881 (2006) (commenting that charter schools are public because
they “receive only public funds, and may not require tuition”)).
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and regulations in exchange for a promise to fulfill the educational
122
mission enumerated in the charter grant.
Pursuant to federal law, the government has developed a definition that charter schools must satisfy in order to qualify for federal
123
funding.
Salient features of the charter school definition limit the
term to public schools with certain qualities. For example, charter
schools are “exempt from significant State or local rules that inhibit
124
The
the flexible operation and management of public schools.”
school must be nonsectarian in its programs, admission policies, and
125
employment practices and not affiliated with a religious institution.
Furthermore, the school is voluntary, may not charge tuition, and
admits students on a lottery basis if more students apply for admission
126
than can be accommodated.
The evolution of federal charter school legislation began with
127
the IASA of 1994. The IASA was adopted two years after Minnesota
enacted the first charter school law and at a time when very few other
128
states had such legislation.
Congress subsequently amended the
federal legislation through the Charter School Expansion Act of
129
Congress again amended the legislation as part of NCLB,
1998.
which provided further funding opportunities for charter schools by
enacting the Innovative Programs and the Public Charter Schools
130
Program for the design and implementation of charter schools.
B. Charter Schools Are Laboratories for Reform

131

The charter school movement is an ideal avenue for incubating
132
change within the American public education system. As previously
122

Id.
See Strengthening and Improvement of Elementary and Secondary Schools
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 8061 (2000)), repealed by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7221–7225g (2000)).
124
20 U.S.C. § 7221i(1)(A) (2000).
125
Id. § 7221i(1)(E).
126
Id. § 7221i(1)(F), (H).
127
Id. § 8061.
128
Martin, supra note 119, at 525 n.82.
129
Pub. L. No. 105-278, 112 Stat. 2682 (1998). “The thrust of this act was to elicit
more funding for and to impose greater accountability on charter schools.” Martin,
supra note 119, at 458.
130
Martin, supra note 119, at 458. (citing Pub. L. No 107-770, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002)).
131
Molly O’Brien, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other and the Next
Century: Free at Last? Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 34 AKRON L. REV.
137, 139 (2000).
123
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mentioned, the majority of the schools currently in NCLB restructur133
ing are located in low-income, minority school districts. Nationally,
“charter schools serve a larger proportion of minority and low134
income students.”
For example, in the 2004–05 school year, fiftyeight percent of charter school students belonged to a minority racial
135
Even more startling, fifty-four percent of charter
or ethnic group.
136
school students were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, and
“charter schools are three times as likely to be located in big-city
137
The fact that
school districts as are traditional public schools.”
schools in NCLB restructuring and charter schools serve a similar
population naturally leads to the proposition that the two can work
hand-in-hand.
Charter school proponents embrace the concept of school
choice as a way to increase competition among schools and offer
necessary alternatives to “deteriorating, badly managed, and obsolete
138
Not only do charter schools serve the stueducational programs.”
dents within their school buildings, but they promote healthy competition by prompting the improvement of traditional public schools.
Traditional public schools must improve or risk losing students and
139
Of course, charter schools are not
the funding attached to them.
the only solution for incubating educational reform. However, because they have demonstrated growing success in advancing academic
achievement among low-performing, disadvantaged students, and because they encourage flexibility, charter schools logically should be at
140
the strategic forefront.
132

Victoria J. Dodd, American Public Education and Change: Not an Oxymoron, 17 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 120 (1997).
133
Kowal & Hassel, supra note 99, at 269.
134
ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 5.
135
HOPES, FEARS AND REALITY: A BALANCED LOOK AT AMERICAN CHARTER SCHOOLS IN
2005 15 (Robin J. Lake & Paul T. Hill eds., 2005), available at http://eric.ed.gov/
ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/27/ff/72.pdf.
136
ALISON CONSOLETTI & JEANNE ALLEN, 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S
CHARTER SCHOOLS 3, 10 (2007). Moreover, charter schools “target services to students at both ends of the instructional spectrum who are being failed by the ‘onesize-fits-all’ educational system: teen parents, special education students, adjudicated
youth, English language learners.” Id.
137
ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 6.
138
Barnes, supra note 118, at 2380.
139
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the robust debate about the effects of choice on traditional public school systems, particularly whether public
schools are in fact induced to improve because of the success of charter schools,
should be acknowledged. See, e.g., BETTS ET AL., supra note 64, at 3–4.
140
NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., CREATING THE SCHOOLS OUR NATION
NEEDS: NCLB REAUTHORIZATION AND THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 1
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The most unique characteristic of a charter school is that its con141
tinued existence is tied to its performance.
Unlike a traditional
public school, the threat of being closed down constantly looms over
a charter school. As noted earlier, the charter school movement
stemmed from an era where accountability and choice were pervasive
142
However, a potential conflict exists between
themes in education.
these dueling themes. A requisite element of choice is that the
school is free to create its own goals and to govern itself independ143
ently. On the other hand, accountability systems impede upon the
concepts of choice and freedom—defining benchmarks for achieve144
ment reduces the autonomy of charter schools.
In turn, charter
schools with below-level test scores are in jeopardy of closing down,
even if parents choose to send their children to these “autonomous”
145
schools.
IV. HARMONIZING NCLB AND CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS:
CAN THE TWO JOIN TOGETHER TO FORM A UNITED FRONT?
An analysis of charter schools must begin with a simple truth:
not all charter laws are created equal. An obvious yet often overlooked attribute of charter schools is that they are creatures of state
law and, therefore, the level of autonomy varies significantly from
146
state to state.
The strength of a charter school law directly bears
147
Expanding
upon the “quantity and viability” of charter schools.
upon this issue is another fact: NCLB’s restructuring provision requires fundamental change in a school’s governance. Naturally, state
(2007), available at http://www.publiccharters.org/files/publications/file_NAPCS_
NCLB_Statement_Singles_for_Web_1_.pdf. Under NCLB, chartering need not be
the first alternative to improving a school, but rather the last option after a school
has passed through the phases of “school improvement” and “corrective action.” See
Hassel et al., supra note 96, at 10.
141
Barnes, supra note 118, at 2407.
142
Loveless, supra note 110, at 177.
143
Id. at 192.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 4.
147
Martin, supra note 119, at 510 (quoting Ctr. for Educ. Reform, Charter School
Laws Across the States: Ranking and Scorecard, at iv–vi, tbl. 1 (8th ed. 2004)). Note that
“strong laws” are not laws that impose more rules, but just the opposite—laws that
allow for greater flexibility. Id. at 511. The notions of quantity and viability will be
fleshed out in the upcoming section, but a basic understanding is necessary. Both
terms denote the level and range of capability granted under state law. Quantity refers to the number of charter schools permitted under state law. Viability refers to
the charter school’s freedom to institute an innovative structure while simultaneously
adhering to the state law’s regulations and guidelines.
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charter laws that do not allow for fundamental change are incompatible with the federal law.
Many states have promulgated rules on the extent to which char148
ter conversion is a permissible restructuring option under NCLB.
These practices fall into three categories: (1) states permitting charter conversions; (2) states disallowing them; or (3) states that are si149
The relationship between state laws
lent on chartering options.
and NCLB’s restructuring options that radically alter a school’s governance structure are examined in the forthcoming sub-sections.
A. “Going Charter” Under NCLB Should Symbolize the Opportunity to
Start Fresh
In theory, chartering under NCLB allows a public school to re150
The framework gives the school greater
open with a “clean slate.”
flexibility than the traditional public school model. When a school
starts fresh, it has the freedom to “build [its] culture, routines, and
systems from the ground up” and “an opportunity to develop from
the start the kind of coherence that is a hallmark of effective
151
schools.”
However, starting fresh is unlikely to be successful unless
state lawmakers develop sound and adaptable systems to implement
152
it.
In reality, charter schools often are not afforded a truly clean
slate. Many charter laws bog down conversion charters with excessive
153
baggage.
As a result, these laws either provide disincentives for
schools to convert or they undermine the flexibility essential for a
charter school to succeed as a restructured school. The effect is that,
in many states, a charter school’s “institutional design is not all that
154
If the purpose of redifferent from traditional public schools.”
structuring is to provide “a fresh start, a blank slate, a New Deal,”
155
then this end is not achieved by rigid state laws.
Rather, the result
148

TODD ZIEBARTH, ECS STATENOTES ACCOUNTABILITY: STATE POLICIES FOR SCHOOL
RESTRUCTURING 1 (2004), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/57/02/
5702.pdf.
149
See id. at 5.
150
ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 5.
151
BRYAN C. HASSEL & LUCY STEINER, STARTING FRESH: A NEW STRATEGY FOR
RESPONDING TO CHRONICALLY LOW PERFORMING SCHOOLS 3 (2003), available at
http://www.publicimpact.com/high-stakes/startingfresh.pdf.
152
Id. at 5.
153
Nelson Smith, Charters as a Solution? So Far, States and Districts Have Opted for
Anything But, EDUC. NEXT, Winter 2007, at 59.
154
Jeffries, supra note 37, at 63.
155
Smith, supra note 153, at 59.
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is that the conversion charter school is structurally indistinguishable
from the traditional public school.
Simply labeling a school a “charter” could not have been what
Congress intended when including chartering as a restructuring option under NCLB. A mere “charter” label is certainly not a step in
the direction toward fundamental reform intended by NCLB’s restructuring provision. To the contrary, each restructuring option requires a substantial reorganization of a school’s governance that will
156
enable the school to make AYP. The chartering option is no different—the restructured school, that is the newly created charter school,
must be fundamentally different than the original school that failed
to meet AYP for six consecutive years. Thus, a charter conversion
that does not yield such a reform in governance is impermissible under NCLB.
B. Conditions for Success: Autonomy, Flexibility, and Adequate
Resources
Based on this analysis of individual state charter laws, this Comment proposes three indispensable characteristics of the kind of
charter law contemplated by NCLB’s restructuring provision: (1)
autonomy, (2) flexibility, and (3) adequate resources. Charter laws
that do not contain these characteristics result in schools that are materially indistinguishable from traditional public schools and thus inconsistent with NCLB’s goal of fundamental reform. Since these
three elements are abstract concepts, this Comment also outlines
concrete examples of each element.
1.

Autonomy

Autonomy is an indispensable characteristic of a strong charter
school law, because it gives charter schools the ability to make independent decisions regarding structure and governance, free from bu157
reaucratic constraints.
Concrete examples of autonomy in charter
school laws include sovereignty to plan curriculum and freedom from
collective bargaining agreements.

156

34 C.F.R. § 200.43 (2007).
William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteenth Century Corporation: A Match Made
in the Public Interest, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023, 1058 (1998) (citing Chester Finn et al.,
Charter Schools in Action: Final Report, Part III, at 2 (1997) (“Under a strong law, the
state’s charter schools are essentially self-governing . . . . They are accountable for
their results but free to produce those results as they see fit.”)).
157
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The first example of autonomy in a charter law is the freedom to
158
design an innovative curriculum. One of the benefits of converting
a traditional public school to a charter school is the ability to create a
new curriculum and pedagogy that will trigger higher levels of stu159
State rules that preclude such innovation underdent learning.
mine the innovative benefits of charter schools. Since charter schools
are governed under the public school system, there is often a set of
standards in place for developing the curriculum. However, charter
schools should be granted greater autonomy in their opportunity to
build upon these existing standards. Creating a unique and challenging curriculum is vital to the construction of a successful charter
160
school. Some state charter laws micromanage curriculum planning
and these restrictions prevent the autonomy necessary for creative
teaching and innovative learning.
Another example of autonomy necessary for charter schools to
succeed in light of NCLB’s restructuring provision is freedom from
collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining agreements
spell out the “terms and conditions of principal and teacher employment and thus greatly restrict the capacity of local administrators
161
to manage schools effectively.”
Such agreements may dictate conditions such as the length of the school year and school day, as well as
162
hiring criteria.
Collective bargaining agreements are especially exhausting for charter schools, which seek to function as autonomous
governing entities. For example, teachers in Rhode Island are required to be part of the district’s bargaining unit and are subject to
the district’s employment terms and conditions, causing strain be163
tween some charter school principals and teachers.
Freeing charter schools from collective bargaining agreements
does not mean that charter school staff should not have the opportunity to bargain as a unit. Rather, such autonomy allows charter
school staff to tailor agreements in a way that will best suit the unique
needs of the school. Some charter laws bind teachers in conversion
charter schools to collective bargaining agreements, whereas teachers

158

CONSOLETTI & ALLEN, supra note 136, at 11.
Id.
160
Id. at 1, 11.
161
Jeffries, supra note 37, at 43.
162
Id.
163
CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, THE SIMPLE GUIDE TO CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS: A
PROGRESS REPORT 24 (Jeanne Allen & Anna Varghese Marcucio eds., 2005), available
at http://www.edreform.com/upload/simpleguide.pdf.
159
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in start-up charter schools are granted more leeway.
For example,
teachers in New Jersey charter conversion schools are bound by collective bargaining agreements, but teachers in start-up charter
schools have the option to be bound or to negotiate as a separate
165
unit. This distinction results in charter conversions being more entangled in the issues concerning traditional public schools, since both
are under the same bargaining units. For instance, the length of the
school day is governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agree166
Many charter schools find it necessary to have a longer
ment.
167
school day to meet the needs of the students. Under a state charter
law, such as New Jersey’s, the charter school cannot make the school
day any longer than what has been bargained for by the teacher’s union.
2.

Flexibility

The second irreducible element of a strong charter school statute is flexibility, which, akin to autonomy, grants charter schools the
sovereignty necessary to ensure success. Since charter schools often
attract minority students who achieved at relatively low levels in a traditional public school, charter schools need flexibility to guarantee
168
these students’ success in an innovative school model. This flexibility allows the charter school to respond to the unique circumstances
169
and needs of its students.
Tangible examples of flexibility include:
longer charter grants, flexible timetables, elimination of the cap on
the number of charters granted, more streamlined and efficient authorization of charter schools, and the ability to bypass case-by-case
granting of waivers from regulation.
The first example of flexibility in a charter law is longer charter
grants. Charter schools are established through limited-term con170
tracts must be renewed at the end of the contract period. In thirty164

See generally ECS STATENOTES, STATE COMPARISONS—STATE POLICIES FOR
CHARTER SCHOOLS (2007), http://mb2.ecs.org/reports/Report.aspx?id=113 (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
165
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-14 (2007); ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164.
166
See generally Jeffries, supra note 37, at 43.
167
CONSOLETTI & ALLEN, supra note 136, at 12.
168
In contrast to traditional public schools, charter schools encounter serious
challenges to their survival. One study reported that eleven percent of charter
schools nationwide have closed, although the reasons for closure vary greatly (e.g.,
academic, financial, managerial). CONSOLETTI & ALLEN, supra note 136, at 5.
169
FINN ET AL., supra note 110, at 14–15.
170
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, DEP’T OF EDUC., THE STATE OF CHARTER
SCHOOLS:
FOURTH
YEAR
REPORT
12
(2000),
available
at
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/charter4thyear/.
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one states, charter grants range between three and five years in dura171
Arizona and the District of Columbia, both ranked as having
tion.
“strong” charter laws, have the longest charter terms of all the states
172
with fifteen years. Longer charter grants are useful, if not essential,
to a charter school’s success because the grants give incentive for
charter school founders to invest time and resources in forming a
173
Furthermore, extended charter grants give a charcharter school.
ter school the opportunity to mold itself to the students’ needs as
time progresses. Since many charter schools serve low-performing
174
students, the school may need time to ensure long-term success.
Similar to longer charter grants, adaptable timetables provide a
charter school with more time to stand on its own. Research on restructuring in general, and more specifically as related to charter
conversions, has confirmed that a fast timeline for instituting restruc175
turing can lead to chaos and poor results.
One study of states’ implementation of the restructuring option under NCLB reported that
few schools chose the chartering option, in part because the NCLB
timetable does not align with the state’s charter application proc176
For example, in post-Katrina New Orleans, Louisiana’s SEA
ess.
announced in October 2004 that certain district schools would be
converted to charter status, and the SEA awarded charter grants to
177
The schools were then
nonprofit organizations in April 2005.
178
Leaders involved in these
slated to open as soon as October 2005.
types of conversions often desire longer planning periods, which are
179
critical to success. It should be noted that there are avenues to circumvent the issue of stringent timelines, all of which can be adapted
to fit within a state’s charter statute. These solutions include allowing
the school to be shut down for a year during renovations and planning, opening the restructured school in the earliest grade only and
171

Id.
CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 163, at 6–7. According to one report, Arizona was ranked as having the strongest charter school law, and the District of Columbia’s law was ranked third among the nation’s charter school laws. Id.
173
Charter schools are typically founded by educators, community groups, or private organizations. ZIEBARTH, supra note 113, at 1.
174
See, e.g., NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., supra note 140, at 1.
175
E.g., MALEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 113–32.
176
WOLF DIBIASE, supra note 12, at 4.
177
Lili LeGardeur, Recovery Roll Call: Four Previously Failing Schools Will Open Next
Year as State-Governed Charter Academies, LA. WEEKLY, May 30, 2005, available at
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/weekly/news/articlegate.pl?20050530j.
178
ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 15.
179
Id. at 15–16. However, allowing for too much time to plan the charter school
can “erode a very necessary sense of urgency.” Id. at 16.
172

GOTTLIEB (FINAL)

2009]

1/26/2009 12:36:46 PM

COMMENT

215

expanding each year thereafter, and granting the charter early, pro180
viding adequate time to plan.
A third type of flexibility requires eliminating state-imposed caps
on the number of charters granted. State-imposed charter caps serve
to limit or slow the growth of charter schools and are often employed
as political tools in disguise. Recent reports show that twenty-five
states plus the District of Columbia have state-imposed caps on the
181
number of charter schools.
Moreover, there are nine states for
which such caps are “severely constraining growth” of charter
182
schools.
State-imposed caps can take various forms, including caps on the
number of schools or on the number of students attending the
schools. For example, Illinois has a “[l]imit of sixty charter schools
for the state, with a maximum of thirty in Chicago, fifteen in Chicago
183
suburbs, and fifteen in the rest of the state.” These restrictions present a serious problem in Chicago, where there are currently twenty184
nine charter schools open and, therefore, room for only one more.
As another example, Rhode Island has a cap of twenty charters in the
entire state, and charter schools may serve no more than four percent
185
Furthermore, in Missouri,
of the state’s school age population.
charter schools are permitted only in Kansas City and St. Louis, and a
maximum of five percent of the operating public schools in each of
186
With respect to statethese cities may be converted to charters.
imposed caps on the number of students in schools, Connecticut limits the percentage of students in charter schools per district, as well as
187
the number of students that enroll in specific schools.
180

Id. It should be noted that the problem with the last of these three solutions is
that granting the charter early requires making an early assumption about a school’s
AYP performance, namely that the school will fail to make AYP. Id.
181
LISA STULBERG, BEYOND THE BATTLE LINES: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK’S CHARTER
CAPS FIGHT 1 (2007), http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ncsrp
_battlelines_jun07.pdf.
182
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-4 (West 2007); see also TODD ZIEBARTH,
PEELING THE LID OFF STATE-IMPOSED CHARTER SCHOOL CAPS 3 (2007), available at
http://www.publiccharters.org/files/publications/file_Issue_Brief_3_09_07rgb.pdf.
These states are Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Utah. Id. at 1.
183
ZIEBARTH, supra 182, at 3–4.
184
Id. “The lack of available charters will likely cause a delay in the mayor’s initiative to close up to 70 low-performing schools and reopen them as 100 or more small
schools, one-third of which will be charter schools.” Id.
185
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-8 (2007).
186
MO. REV. STAT. § 160.400 (2007).
187
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66BB (2007). With aid from Governor Jodi Rell, the
Connecticut Legislature amended this cap to allow charters with an established re-
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Proponents of caps maintain that charter schools are an unproven experiment; that charter schools destabilize school districts;
that charter schools undermine systemic alteration; and that charter
188
schools run contrary to the idea of public school education.
The
proper response to these arguments is to propose a compromise, in
which state-imposed caps are maintained in some way. One option is
for states to tie caps to charter quality, as opposed to an arbitrary
number or percentage. Artificial limitations do not serve a valid purpose, but rather are illogical or political in nature. A second option is
to allow schools restructuring under NCLB to convert to charter
189
This alternative
schools, even if this would exceed the state’s cap.
would be especially helpful in school districts where there are too few
schools to which students can transfer, thereby broadening the edu190
cational choices for students surrounded by failing schools.
A fourth example of flexibility in a state charter law involves the
authorizers of charter schools. As previously mentioned, charter authorizers review grant proposals and distribute charter grants. Gaining approval to establish a charter school is one of the first barriers to
191
entry.
In eleven states, limits on the number of charters that may
192
The problem
be authorized by particular persons or entities exist.
with limiting which people can authorize charters is that political
agendas often take center stage, and these designs “are likely to redistribute to charters much of the bureaucratic micromanagement
193
applicable to traditional public schools.”
Contrasting state charter school laws’ stance on authorizers
demonstrates the drastic variation in state laws. Again, the charter
law in Arizona is often cited as an ideal framework. Arizona, which
has been ranked as having the best charter law in the nation, has the
most number of charter schools in a state, with 469 schools operating
cord of success to increase enrollment to eighty-five students per grade. ZIEBARTH,
supra note 148, at 2.
188
STULBERG, supra note 181, at 2.
189
Id.
190
Id. “The relatively small number of students taking advantage of NCLB’s
choice options in underserved communities is well documented, as are the huge
waiting lists for public charter schools in these same jurisdictions. The problem is
one of supply, and one that charters can help solve.” Id.
191
John F. White, Arnold F. Shober & Paul Manna, Analyzing State Charter School
Laws and Their Influence on the Formation of Charter Schools in the United States, paper
prepared for the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n 2003 Ann. Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, at 9,
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/wcss/docs/WitteShoberManna-APSA-03.pdf.
192
TODD ZIEBARTH, STUNTING GROWTH: THE IMPACT OF STATE-IMPOSED CAPS ON
CHARTER SCHOOLS 3 (2006).
193
Jeffries, supra note 37, at 63.
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194

as of April 2007. Arizona allows for numerous persons or entities to
authorize a charter grant, including local school boards, the state
195
board of education, or the state board for charter schools. In stark
contrast, New Jersey allows only the State Commissioner of Education
196
to authorize charter schools.
The final example of flexibility in charter laws is the ability to
bypass case-by-case granting of regulation waivers. Regulation waivers
limit the number of government regulations to which the charter
school must adhere. Case-by-case bypassing is a severely restrictive
means of controlling charter schools, operating as yet another obstacle to achieving both flexibility and autonomy. Some states are unwilling to budge and refuse to bypass major regulations, while other
states require charters schools to apply for an exemption of each
regulation, a time-consuming and unnecessarily bureaucratic process.
In the 2001–02 school year, only approximately two-thirds of states
reported that charter schools were exempt from certain basic requirements: the length of the school day or year (sixty-eight percent);
faculty hiring and firing policies (sixty-five percent); and other
197
teacher policies, such as tenure requirements (sixty-one percent).
Although waivers from regulations are often included in state charter
laws, crucial rules concerning student achievement, governing personnel, and fiscal matters often are not initially waived. This additional hurdle symbolizes the systemic pattern of bureaucratic obstacles.
A national survey concluded that only one-third of charter
schools receive automatic waivers from state policies and regulations,
198
while many other schools receive waivers on a case-by-case basis.
Once again, states vary as to their approach to waivers. In Connecticut, a charter school application may include requests to waive provi199
In Nevada, certain
sions of the general statutes and regulations.
exemptions from particular regulations and policies may be negotiated and specified in the charter grant or requested later through a
200
waiver process.
194

NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., NUMBER OF CHARTER SCHOOLS AND
STUDENTS IN THE 2006–07 SCHOOL YEAR (2007), available at http://www.public
charters.org/files/publications/2007_Charter_Numbers_1_.pdf.
195
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-183 (LexisNexis 2007); ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164.
196
N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:36A-3 (2000).
197
ARKIN & KOWAL, supra note 112, at 14; SRI INT’L, EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT 31 (2004).
198
SRI INT’L, supra note 197, at 31.
199
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66BB (2001); see also ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164.
200
NEV. REV. STAT. § 386.550 (2003); see also ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164.
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Some regulations are a necessary evil to ensure accountability for
charter schools. However, such government regulations should not
severely impede upon a charter school’s need for flexibility. Limiting
across-the-board regulations to those including overall educational
achievement—such as student academic growth—and procedural
mandates—such as healthy-and-safety and anti-discrimination rules—
are sufficient to hold charter schools accountable while simultane201
ously freeing them from unnecessary constraints.
3.

Adequate Resources

Resources are intertwined with a school’s governance structure.
For example, the capability to attract highly qualified teachers and
administrators rests on the capacity to compensate these persons with
competitive salaries. Additionally, the ability to focus attention and
resources on achievement rests on the ability to shift attention away
from financial constraints. While funding is a critical factor in providing adequate resources, money alone does not necessarily lead to
better schools. It is well documented that “thinly-funded schools can
sometimes be superb and that lavishly-funded schools can be aw202
ful.”
Critics often charge that charter schools are stealing money from
203
public schools.
However, since charters are public schools, the
money directed toward them is not being “drained” from the public
204
education system. Rather, it is following the student from the traditional public school to a charter school. Unfortunately, “misinformed debates” regarding the financial impact of charter schools
205
impedes the efforts to create high-performing charter schools.
Even though charter schools may cause a short-term financial nuisance for a school district, this effect is counteracted by viewing charter schools as long-term investments, both financially and academi206
cally.

201

Jeffries, supra note 37, at 64.
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY’S NEXT
FRONTIER ix (2005), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/charter%20
School%20Funding%202005%20FINAL.pdf. This statement is applicable to both
traditional public schools and charter schools.
203
MATTHEW ARKIN & BRIAN C. HASSEL, THE BOTTOM LINE: SIX MYTHS ABOUT THE
FINANCIAL IMPACT OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS 1 (2007).
204
Id. at 2.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 2, 6.
202
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Nevertheless, funding does matter to the survival of the charter
207
school system.
Charter laws that provide more resources in a
timely, non-bureaucratic fashion are more likely to have high208
achieving charter schools.
Most charter laws address funding in at
209
First, the charter law usually allots a level of operaleast two ways.
210
For instance, California’s charter law states that
tional funding.
charters must be accorded “operational funding that is equal to the
total funding that would be available to a similar school district serv211
ing a similar pupil population.” According to a study conducted by
the Fordham Foundation, however, California charter schools receive
212
31.5% less funding per pupil than traditional public schools.
Second, the charter law provides a list of expenses to be funded directly
213
by the charter school.
For example, Tennessee’s law states that
214
charter schools are in charge of transportation costs.
Charter schools, although a growing part of America’s educational landscape, are funded at significantly lower levels than tradi215
tional public schools. Concrete examples of resources include, but
are not limited to, the following: start-up funds, per-pupil funding,
facilities funding, leniency with debt accrual, and technical support.
The lack of each of these resources stems from some form of a defect
in the state’s charter law or implementation of its law.
The first type of resource necessary for a strong charter law is
start-up funds. Finding money to start a charter school is a large and
often insurmountable hurdle. For example, if a charter organization
knows that it will need to seek renewal at the end of its short grant,
the organization may be less likely to commit the initial investment to
216
start the school.
Most states do not provide start-up or planning
grants to charter schools, but of course, there are some exceptions.
For instance, California provides charter schools with a loan fund for
207

Gary Miron, Strong Charter School Laws Are Those That Result in Positive Outcomes,
THE EVALUATION CTR. AT W. MICH. UNIV., 2005, at 6, http://www.wmich.edu/
evalctr/charter/aera_2005_paper_charter_school_laws.pdf.
208
Id.
209
SOLVING THE CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING GAP: THE SEVEN MAJOR CAUSES AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM 2 (Shaka L.A. Mitchell & Jeanne Allen eds., 2005) [Hereinafter FUNDING GAP].
210
Id.
211
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47630 (Deering 2007).
212
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 28.
213
FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 2.
214
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-114 (2007).
215
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 1.
216
Sheri Williams, State Foundation of Charter Schools in Kansas, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 103, 114 (2004).
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as much as $250,000 and allows up to five years for repayment.
218
New Mexico’s legislature
Georgia permits $5000 planning grants.
annually appropriates money to a charter school stimulus fund to
219
support both conversion and start-up charter schools.
The next, and perhaps most powerful, ingredient for granting
adequate resources in a strong charter law is per-pupil funding. Most
charter schools receive substantially less money than traditional pub220
lic schools. This disparity exists despite eleven state supreme courts
having held that charter schools are public schools and are therefore
entitled to the same financial resources as traditional public
221
According to one report, the per-pupil funding disparity
schools.
222
ranged from $414 in North Carolina to $3638 in Missouri.
On average, charter funding falls short of traditional public school funding
223
Only in Minnesota do charter
by $1801 per pupil, or 21.7%.
schools actually receive more per-pupil funding dollars (102.4%)
224
than their traditional public school peers.
Weak charter laws automatically put charter schools at a funding
disadvantage, particularly with respect to per-pupil funding. For example, New Jersey’s charter school law guarantees only ninety per225
cent of the funds that traditional public schools receive, but that
percentage is not an accurate reflection of how much charters actu226
New Jersey Supreme Court decisions have
ally receive per pupil.
mandated “thorough and equitable” funding for impoverished
227
school districts, known as Abbott Districts.
Since the principle of
“thorough and efficient” is a product of judicial determination, and
New Jersey’s charter law fails to refer to this type of funding, only
fifty-seven percent of per pupil dollars actually reaches charter
228
schools in the most under-achieving Abbott Districts.

217

ECS STATENOTES, supra note 164.
Id.
219
Id.
220
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 6.
221
E.g., Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. City Neighbors Charter Sch., 929 A.2d
113 (Md. 2007). See generally FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 1.
222
THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at 6.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 1–2. This somewhat minor advantage is a result of the needier student
population served in Minnesota's charter schools. Id.
225
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-12(b) (Supp. 2008).
226
FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3.
227
See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 454 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d
376, 380 (N.J. 1985); FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3.
228
FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3.
218
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Other examples of state charter laws that cause a severe disparity
between charter schools and traditional schools are easily found. Using data from the 2001–02 school year, the Fordham Foundation observed that traditional public schools in Dayton, Ohio, received
$10,802 per pupil, whereas charter schools received only $7510, re229
sulting in a thirty percent discrepancy.
Additionally, in 2005, the
Franklin City School Board in New Hampshire chose to cut district
funding for the Franklin Career Academy charter school from a flat
230
This harsh reduction ex$82,000 total expenditure to one dollar.
posed a major flaw in New Hampshire’s charter law, namely the local
231
district’s ability to capriciously reduce funding for charter schools.
The third example of a resource essential for a strong charter
law is facilities funding. Generally state laws prevent charter schools
from receiving facilities funding, forcing charters to lease or purchase
a building on the open market and to do so using the already limited
232
per-pupil subsidy.
On the other hand, states generally give traditional public schools a free building and state funding for additional
233
capital needs.
Since charter schools may not be allotted funds to
purchase or lease facilities, they are forced to use money that would
otherwise go to academic efforts. In effect, “[w]hen charters need to
spend operating dollars on bricks and mortar, the effort to build
234
235
achievement can falter,” and they may forgo highly qualified staff.
The California Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Sequoia Union
236
High School District v. Aurora Charter High School, in which a school
district in Redwood City, California, one of the wealthiest cities in the
state, filed suit to stop Aurora Charter School from receiving facilities
237
Sequoia argued that it had no legal obligations to
funding.

229

THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 202, at vii.
FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 3.
231
Id.
232
Jeffries, supra note 37, at 63.
233
Id. (citing Caroline M. Hoxby, Achievement in Charter Schools and Regular Public
Schools in the United States: Understanding the Differences, http://www.innovations.
harvard.edu/cache/documents/4848.pdf) (“Charter school students are more likely
to have a proficiency advantage if their state has a strong charter school law that gives
the schools autonomy and that ensures that charter schools get funding equal to at
least 40 percent of the total per-pupil funding of regular public schools.”).
234
ZIEBARTH, supra note 192, at 5.
235
FUNDING GAP, supra note 209, at 8.
236
5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
237
Id. at 90.
230
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238

Aurora.
The court disagreed, ruling that Sequoia must provide fa239
cilities funding.
Yet another example of adequate resources for charter schools
comes in the form of the state law’s stance on debt accrual. Some
state charter laws ban or severely limit charter schools from incurring
debt. One scholar notes that lifting these bans would permit charters
to make multi-year contracts with educational service vendors, much
240
like traditional public schools do.
Furthermore, eliminating the
debt accrual ban would allow for more efficient and stable plan241
ning.
The DOE has created a program to alleviate some of the debt
burdens charter schools face. The Credit Enhancement for Charter
School Facilities Program offers financial assistance to charter
242
schools.
In order to “leverage funds for charter school facilities,
grant recipients may . . . guarantee and insure debt to finance charter
243
This program represents the federal governschool facilities.”
ment’s interest in providing aid to charter schools. The DOE notes
that “[u]nlike traditional local education agencies, charter schools
often lack the ability to issue low risk, general obligation bonds
244
backed by property taxes.”
Parallel to this federal program, strong
state charter laws include similar programs to facilitate a charter
school’s growth and success.
The final way in which resources impact the strength of a state’s
charter law is through technical support. This example is unique in
the realm of resources, because it does not constitute traditional
monetary support, unlike the aforementioned examples. Technical
assistance is “practical advice offered by an expert source that ad245
dresses specific areas for improvement.”
Examples of technical assistance include the following: data analysis (helping the school analyze results of state assessment tests), identification and
implementation of strategies (helping the school choose effective instructional strategies and ensuring that the staff receives professional

238

Id.
Id. at 94.
240
Martin, supra note 119, at 519.
241
Id.
242
34 C.F.R. § 225.1 (2007).
243
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Credit Enhancement for Charter School Facilities,
http://www.ed.gov/programs/charterfacilities/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
244
Id.
245
OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., supra note 6, at 14.
239
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development), and budget analysis (helping the school in revising its
246
budget to ensure funding that will increase student achievement).
Technical assistance is generally provided by SEAs, charter
247
school authorizers, and charter school resource centers.
Ensuring
that technical assistance will be provided is essential to a charter
248
school’s success, particularly during the planning stages.
This resource proves important in two respects. First, similar to facilities
funding, technical assistance allows charter schools to focus their attention and economic resources on other matters. Second, SEAaided assistance ensures that charter schools are successfully teaching
students and, moreover, that students are likely to meet state standards, an issue that returns to the earlier discussion of state benchmarks and AYP.
V. CONCLUSION
Achievement and accountability are the hallmarks of NCLB.
Schools that do not meet state-mandated achievement benchmarks
are, in turn, held accountable through a series of escalating penalties,
from “school improvement” to “corrective action,” and ultimately
249
culminating in “restructuring.”
NCLB’s restructuring provision requires schools to fundamentally reform their governance after failing
250
Each of the five restructurto meet AYP for six consecutive years.
ing options requires a radical, systemic change in governance. Notably, the chartering option involves the school district closing down
251
On the
the “failing” school and reopening it as a charter school.
surface, the charter restructuring option symbolizes a clean slate for
252
the school.
In reality, however, many state charter school laws obstruct the school’s ability to truly transform its governance structure
in compliance with NCLB’s restructuring provision.
Charter laws that bog down charter schools with unnecessary
and stifling regulations result in schools that are materially indistinguishable from traditional public schools, which is inconsistent with
253
the goals of NCLB. In order for these goals to be met, charter laws
must possess three indispensable characteristics: autonomy, flexibil246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Id.
Miron, supra note 207, at 5.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (Supp. II 2002).
See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(8)(B).
Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i).
See ZIEBARTH, supra note 148, at 5.
Smith, supra note 153, at 59.
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ity, and adequate resources. These elements ensure that charter conversion schools truly represent a fundamental reform in governance,
which is the underlying principle of NCLB’s restructuring provision.
To do any less would betray the promise to change the culture of the
nation’s schools in order to guarantee all children a “fair, equal, and
254
significant opportunity” to attain a high-quality education.

254

20 U.S.C. § 6301.

